Agencia e integridad epistémica en la escritura a distancia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14393/DLv19a2025-66Palabras clave:
Escritura a Distancia. , Agencia Epistémica, Curación Epistémica, Inteligencia Artificial, AutoríaResumen
En este artículo, examinamos las dimensiones epistémicas y éticas de la "escritura a distancia", una forma de composición asistida por IA, en el contexto de la producción filosófica y académica. Dado el desafío que los Grandes Modelos de Lenguaje (LLM) plantean a las nociones tradicionales de autoría, el texto desarrolla una visión positiva para su uso responsable. Argumentamos que, en lugar de disminuir la agencia humana, la escritura a distancia reconfigura el rol del autor como agente epistémico curador. Basándonos en conceptos epistémicos, distinguimos la agencia intencional del filósofo de la mera instrumentalidad de la máquina, enmarcando la curaduría como un acto cognitivo exigente que implica un diseño rápido, una evaluación crítica y una integración argumentativa. Analizamos los riesgos epistémicos, como la generación de simulacros epistémicos, y proponemos que el cultivo de virtudes intelectuales, como la vigilancia y la humildad, es esencial para mitigarlos. Finalmente, argumentamos que la integridad del autor ya no puede regirse por nociones de plagio como robo, sino por un imperativo de transparencia, para lo cual proponemos una taxonomía de la divulgación ética.
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