Sobre os fins do Direito Penal

deve o Estado ocupar-se da Proteção de Bens Jurídicos?

Abstract

It is common among jurists to understand that the criminal intervention in the sphere of freedom of the citizens is only legitimate if it is to protect the essential goods of individuals and society, known as legal goods. Any interference of the State that exceeds this finality is considered terror. Internationally renowned
thinkers, as Claus Roxin and Winfried Hassemer as well as national jurists share that same concept. However, this understanding is not unanimous. Some people treat the legitimacy of State intervention in other ways, especially Günther Jakobs. These thinkers have different approaches to legitimize and limit the State performance, but the ideas of Jakobs gain greater prominence. In his view, the criminal protection is not of legal goods, but of the law, because it reflects the relationships that structure the society. Despite the consistency of his argument, it is not enough to dispel the concept of legal goods. Admittedly, the penalty is
intended to ensure the validity of the law, but that is not the purpose of the formal system of social control. The penalty ensures the validity of the law, which in turn leads to the criminalization of the conducts that are detrimental to the legal goods, which is the primary purpose of the criminal law. The idea of the exclusive
protection of legal goods is a historic achievement in the protection of individual and collective rights, and ensures the largest possible sphere of freedom for citizens.