Resumo
O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em analisar a reação dos fundos de ações às alterações na classificação das empresas abertas brasileiras conforme os segmentos especiais de listagem da bolsa de valores do Brasil. Para isso, foram selecionadas todas as empresas abertas que sofreram alguma alteração em seu segmento de listagem no período de janeiro de 2010 a novembro de 2018, sendo a amostra final composta por 34 companhias. Quanto aos fundos de investimento, foram considerados todos os fundos de ações com dados disponíveis no período. Os resultados indicam uma relação positiva e estatisticamente significativa entre as variáveis para a soma dos percentuais investidos pelos fundos nas empresas e a variável dummy para o mês de mudança no segmento de listagem e os dois meses seguintes. Desta forma, a partir do momento em que as companhias mudam para um segmento de listagem com maiores exigências em termos de governança corporativa, os fundos de ações aparentam aumentar os investimentos em ações dessas empresas. Esta pesquisa contribui ao fornecer evidências do efeito que os padrões de governança corporativa das empresas exercem na decisão de investimento dos fundos de ações. Quanto às limitações, este estudo está sujeito à amostra de 34 empresas que tiveram alguma alteração nos segmentos de listagem e o uso de somente da categoria de fundos de ações.
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